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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 17-2915
_______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
ERIK JOHNSON, a/k/a TANK,
Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2:01-cr-00538-002)
District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on March 22, 2018
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, and HARDIMAN and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: August 16, 2018)
_______________
OPINION*
_______________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.

BIBAS, Circuit Judge.
Even a succinct statement of reasons can suffice to explain a judge’s decision to grant
or deny a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Erik Johnson appeals the District Court’s decision to reduce his life sentence to forty rather than thirty years’ imprisonment. We will affirm.
I.
Johnson led the Third World Crips gang, which operated in a Newark housing project.
With his two codefendants, he oversaw a conspiracy that sold heroin, powder cocaine, and
crack cocaine to more than a thousand people. The gang was brutal: Gang members shot,
beat, and attacked residents with dogs. Once, when Johnson and his confederates suspected
a woman of stealing drugs stored in her apartment, they held her face against a radiator.
After nearly a decade of running this drug ring, Johnson was convicted of conspiring to
distribute, and possessing with intent to distribute, heroin, cocaine, and cocaine base. His
prior felony drug conviction triggered an additional twenty-year minimum sentence.
The District Court sentenced Johnson to life imprisonment plus twenty years, finding
that Johnson was “the most dominant” of the violent gang members. App. 28. We affirmed.
United States v. Johnson, 89 F. App’x 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2004).
In 2014, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 782, which retroactively lowered base offense levels for several drug quantities. U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 782 (2014);
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d). This amendment lowered Johnson’s base offense level, so his nowadvisory Guidelines range became 360 months to life. Johnson asked the District Court to
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reduce his sentence. The government at first disputed Johnson’s calculation, but on appeal
confessed error. We summarily remanded to the District Court.
On remand, the District Court lowered Johnson’s sentence from life to forty years, rather than the thirty years he had requested. Instead of issuing an opinion, the Court filled
out form AO-247, checking two boxes and filling in several blanks. The check marks noted
that Johnson had moved to reduce his sentence and that the Court granted the motion, reducing his sentence from life to 480 months. The form also included preprinted language
stating that the judge had “considered [Johnson’s] motion, and tak[en] into account the
policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they are applicable.” App. 6. Finally, the Court also attached
a one-paragraph Statement of Reasons explaining that it had considered the parties’ arguments, Johnson’s offense conduct, his conduct in prison, and his age in light of the length
of his sentence. Johnson appeals.
II.
Johnson claims the District Court erred procedurally by not applying the statutory sentencing factors reasonably and not explaining its decision adequately. We review the denial
of a sentence-reduction motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Thompson, 825 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2016).
Proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) are a “limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence.” Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826 (2010). The Supreme Court has declined
to opine on whether § 3582(c)(2) decisions require the same level of explanation as original
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sentencings. Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018). The Court assumed “purely for argument’s sake” that they do, drawing on its original-sentencing decisions to set guideposts for how extensively judges must explain their § 3582(c)(2) decisions. Id. The explanation needed depends “upon the circumstances of the particular case,”
leaving “much to the judge’s own professional judgment.” Id. at 1965-66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Johnson objects that the District Court did not “reference the reasons behind
Amendment 782.” Appellant’s Br. 20. He argues that a thirty-year sentence would have
sufficed, because his range already incorporated his enhancements for possessing a gun,
helping to lead the gang, and using minors to distribute drugs. He also argues that because
he is over forty years old, he is less likely to recidivate and so poses less of a threat to
public safety. His prison record too supports relief, “[d]espite [a] rocky start.” Id. at 22.
Although “[h]e incurred nine disciplinary infractions during his first 13 years of incarceration”—out of fifteen that he has served—“Johnson made a clean start when he learned
that there was a possibility of relief from his life sentence.” Id. at 21, 22.
The record shows that the District Court exercised its discretion properly. Its statement,
though brief, and the accompanying record, adequately explained the reasons for Johnson’s
new sentence. It was well within the Court’s “professional judgment” not to credit Johnson’s newfound good behavior. Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1968. That is especially true
because one of his infractions, in 2013, included “orchestra[ing a] narcotics drug introduction scheme” in prison. App. 86.
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The District Court had Johnson’s entire record before it when it weighed his motion.
That record included Johnson’s violent crimes and the testimony of his victims. It also
included the finding by his original sentencing judge that Johnson had a “proclivity to violence” and a “demonstrate[d] . . . disregard for authority.” App. 29. Given the heinousness
of Johnson’s crimes and his poor record in prison, “it is unsurprising that the judge considered a sentence somewhat higher than the bottom of the reduced range to be appropriate.”
Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967.
The District Court also properly considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors and policy
statements. It considered Johnson’s arguments, the conduct underlying his conviction, his
prison record, and his age in light of his remaining sentence. This “explanation (minimal
as it was) fell within the scope of the lawful professional judgment that the law confers
upon the sentencing judge.” Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1968. So the Court did not abuse
its discretion. We will affirm.
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